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A SHOCKING LOSS OF INVESTOR
PROTECTION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF

MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of federal securities laws in the 1930s, securities
markets around the world have become more interconnected than anyone
could have imagined at that time.1 The antifraud provisions of the U.S.
securities laws are silent as to their extraterritorial application, however, and
as international securities transactions became commonplace, courts were
forced to address the question of whether these provisions applied to
transactions involving foreign parties or foreign-traded stock.2 For decades,
in dealing with this issue, the courts sought to balance the protection of
investors and markets with respect for the sovereignty of other nations.
Recently, the Supreme Court, for the first time, addressed the issue of the
extraterritoriality of U.S. antifraud provisions in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank.3 In this landmark case, the Court overturned nearly forty
years of precedent4 and stripped the protection of American antifraud laws
from Americans investing abroad. As a result, if such investors suffer losses
due to securities fraud, they now have no choice but to seek redress under
the laws and procedures of foreign jurisdictions.
This note will examine some of the securities class action laws and
procedures of other countries and discuss whether, as a result of Morrison,
American investors transacting abroad are left without sufficient protection
against foreign securities fraud. Part I of this note provides background as
to how the courts dealt with the question of the extraterritorial application
of U.S. securities laws prior to Morrison. Part II presents the facts and
procedural history of Morrison. Additionally, it sets out the new test
articulated by the Supreme Court, and its implications, including forcing
Americans investing abroad to seek redress for securities fraud in foreign
jurisdictions. Part III examines some of the securities class action
procedures found in other countries and how they provide insufficient
1. See Daniel S. Kahn, The Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud Provisions
of the U.S. Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress Forty Years of
Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 365, 369–70 (2010) (“[T]he Congress that enacted the securities
laws could not have anticipated the future globalization of the American economy. . . . The web of
international connections in the securities market was then not nearly as extensive or complex as it
has become.”).
2. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). See also Hannah
L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 18–19 (2007) (“[T]he anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws do not speak directly to the scope of their application in
the international context.”).
3. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
4. See id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Court should have adhered to “the
general approach that has been the law in the Second Circuit, and most of the rest of the country,
for nearly four decades”).
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protection for American investors. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that Congress
should, in furtherance of the goals of U.S. securities laws, legislate to
mitigate the effects of Morrison, and I offer a legislative proposal to better
protect American investors and deter foreign securities fraud.
I. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS PRE-

MORRISON
Over the past forty years, U.S. courts struggled to determine whether
the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws applied to securities
transactions involving foreign issuers or foreign-traded stock.5 This is due
to the fact that the prevailing antifraud measure regulating secondary
markets, § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange
Act), is silent as to the extraterritorial application of the law.6 As a result,
courts were forced to create and apply their own tests, which focused on
“whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United
States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted” to a securities
fraud claim with extraterritorial elements.7 Prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Morrison, the lower federal courts framed the issue as one of
subject matter jurisdiction: U.S. courts could potentially have subject matter
jurisdiction over claims with extraterritorial elements if the claim was based
on conduct taking place in the United States, or on effects felt within the
United States.8
A. THE CONDUCT TEST
Under what was aptly named the “conduct” test, U.S. courts exercised
jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities fraud actions if enough fraudulent

5. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (2009) (“[M]uch uncertainty surrounds the
consideration of extraterritorial issues within securities class-action lawsuits. The individual
doctrines applied within the courts—such as the conduct and effects tests—are often ambiguous
and difficult to predict.”).
6. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). It follows that, since Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under § 10(b), they have the
same scope. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) (“Liability under Rule 10b-5
. . . does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.”).
7. Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125
(2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
8. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 18–20.
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conduct occurred within the United States.9 Under the standard applied by
the Second Circuit,10 to assert jurisdiction, the domestic conduct must have
“directly caused” the loss to plaintiffs and must have been more than
“merely preparatory” to the fraud that occurred abroad.11 An additional
consideration was whether exercising jurisdiction over a particular
extraterritorial dispute would discourage fraudulent actors from using the
United States to defraud investors.12 Courts reasoned that expanding the
reach of U.S. securities laws and actively policing global markets would
deter international securities fraud and encourage other countries to
implement and enforce their own securities fraud laws in cross-border
transactions.13
B. THE EFFECTS TEST
The “effects” test, which has been applied both alone and in
conjunction with the “conduct” test,14 was first articulated in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook.15 The test focused on whether the fraudulent activity that
occurred overseas had a substantial effect on U.S. markets or citizens.16 The

9. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986–87 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. The Second Circuit’s standard:
[E]stablished that application of § 10(b) could be premised upon either some effect on
American securities markets or investors (Schoenbaum) or significant conduct in the
United States (Leasco). It later formalized these two applications into (1) an “effects
test,” “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or
upon United States citizens,” and (2) a “conduct test,” “whether the wrongful conduct
occurred in the United States.”
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
11. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction if the defendant’s conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to
the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly caused
losses to foreign investors abroad.”).
12. See Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d at 125 (reasoning that “Congress would not want
the United States to become a base for fraudulent activity harming foreign investors”). See also
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that, from a policy perspective,
jurisdiction should be asserted because Congress did not “intend[] to allow the United States to
become a ‘Barbary Coast,’ . . . harboring international securities ‘pirates’”).
13. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for
the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 99–100 (2003). See also Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (“By finding jurisdiction
here, we may encourage other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to
perpetrate fraud in the United States.”).
14. The Second Circuit generally applies both the “conduct” and the “effects” tests together.
See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n admixture or combination
of the two [tests] often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.”).
15. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. See id. at 206 (“We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
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policy behind this approach was one of American self-interest: American
investors should be protected even if the fraud affecting them occurred
abroad.17 Yet, claims of reducing investor confidence or of a general
detrimental effect on the U.S. economy were later held to be insufficient to
establish jurisdiction.18 Plaintiffs were required to show that a specific U.S.
interest was adversely affected by the foreign conduct.19
C. THE END OF THE LINE FOR THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS
While the “conduct” and “effects” tests were originally articulated in
decisions by the Second Circuit, other circuit courts adopted different
standards as to the nature and amount of domestic activity required in order
to find subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign transaction.20 As a result,
several commentators criticized these tests as ambiguous,21 inconsistent,22
and unpredictable,23 and called for clearer, stricter standards in determining
improper foreign transactions in American securities.”). See also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).
17. See Schoebaum, 405 F.2d at 208 (stating that subject matter jurisdiction should be
exercised over transactions that take place outside the United States, which “are detrimental to the
interests of American investors”).
18. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
jurisdiction did not exist where there was only “an adverse effect on this country’s general
economic interests or on American security prices”). See also Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22
(stating that plaintiffs “must show detrimental effect on specific interests within the United
States,” as courts “have consistently rejected arguments that U.S. securities law reaches foreign
conduct simply because that conduct affects general confidence in the U.S. securities markets”).
19. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989.
20. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 25 (“Over the years, the different circuits have developed
competing standards for evaluating the kind or quantity of local conduct that is necessary to create
jurisdiction over predominantly foreign transactions.”). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits adopted
approaches similar to that of the Second Circuit. See Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc’ns
Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906–07 (5th Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667
(7th Cir. 1998). The D.C. Circuit took a stricter interpretation and required that the domestic
conduct itself be an independent violation of U.S. securities laws. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson
& Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30–33 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On the other hand, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits adopted a broad approach, which required that the domestic conduct be in furtherance of
the alleged fraud. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); Continental Grain (Austl.)
Pty. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712
F.2d 421, 424–25 (9th Cir. 1983).
21. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 467 (“[M]uch uncertainty surrounds the
consideration of extraterritorial issues within securities class-action lawsuits. The individual
doctrines applied within the courts—such as the conduct and effects tests—are often ambiguous
and difficult to predict.”).
22. See Chang, supra note 13, at 96 (“[C]ourts do not apply the conduct test with the same
degree of uniformity.”); Michael J. Kaufman, Supreme Court’s Test in Morrison for
Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5 to Foreign Cubed Cases, in 26 SEC. LITIG.: DAMAGES
§ 10:2.50 (2011) (“[F]ederal circuits that confronted the question [of whether there is subject
matter jurisdiction under the conducts test] came up with a number of different approaches.”).
23. See Robert L. Hickok & Daniel J. Boland, Do Antifraud Provisions of U.S. Securities Laws
Apply to Foreign Actions?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp
/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202437129880&slreturn=1 (“There is a split among the circuit courts
regarding the proper interpretation of the conduct test, potentially resulting in different outcomes
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whether there was jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities claims.24
Recently, however, the Supreme Court surprised many25 with its decision in
Morrison by rejecting and replacing the “conduct” and “effects” tests.26
II. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
National Australia Bank (NAB), located and incorporated in Australia,
has “ordinary shares,” 27 which trade on the Australian Securities Exchange
and other foreign exchanges.28 American Depository Receipts (ADRs)29 of
NAB trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).30 In 1998, NAB
purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), an American mortgage
service provider located in Florida.31 In 2001, NAB incurred multiple writedowns totaling nearly $2.25 billion as a result of faulty valuation models
related to valuing HomeSide’s assets.32 NAB’s share price fell sharply upon
these disclosures and several foreign individuals who owned NAB shares
(the Plaintiffs),33 brought suit in the Southern District of New York against
NAB, HomeSide, and several officers of both companies (collectively, the
Defendants).34 The Plaintiffs alleged that, with the knowledge of NAB and
its officers, HomeSide misrepresented financial models to inflate the value
of the company’s assets, and, as a result, NAB “made materially false and
misleading statements in SEC filings, annual reports and press releases
regarding HomeSide’s profitability, economic health and its contribution to
NAB,” in violation of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and

on similar fact patterns.”); Chang, supra note 13, at 117 (“The aggressive and inconsistent judicial
response to transnational securities fraud has not ensured predictability in the application of
antifraud rules.”).
24. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 468; Chang, supra note 13, at 118–21; Kahn, supra
note 1, at 411–12.
25. Sarah L. Cave, F-Cubed=0: Supreme Court’s Decision in ‘Morrison v. National Australia
Bank,’ N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2010, at 4 (noting that the Court’s opinion was “a more far-reaching
ruling than many anticipated”).
26. Kaufman, supra note 22 (“[T]he Supreme Court explicitly rejected the ‘conduct and
effects’ test articulated by the Second Circuit.”).
27. “Ordinary shares” are the “equivalent of American common stock.” Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
28. Id.
29. ADRs represent “one or more shares of foreign stock or a fraction of a share” and give the
holders the “right to obtain the foreign stock [they] represent[].” American Depository Receipts,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
30. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 168.
31. Id. at 168–69.
32. Id. at 169.
33. The initial plaintiffs consisted of both foreign plaintiffs (residents of Australia) who owned
NAB ordinary shares, as well as a domestic plaintiff, who owned ADRs trading on the NYSE. The
domestic plaintiff’s claims were dismissed in the district court for failing to allege damages and
were not appealed. Thus, the Second Circuit and Supreme Court decisions focused solely on the
claims of the foreign plaintiffs. Id. at 170 n.3.
34. Id. at 169.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.35 Actions such as
this one, where foreign plaintiffs bring a claim against a foreign issuer over
a foreign securities transaction, are referred to as “foreign-cubed” or “fcubed” litigation.36 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York applied the Second Circuit’s “conduct” and “effects” tests,37 and
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.38
On appeal, the Plaintiffs argued that U.S. securities laws were
applicable to their claim by virtue of the conduct test because the fraudulent
activity occurred at HomeSide, which was located in the United States.39
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, however, and
in utilizing the “conduct” and “effects” tests, concluded that jurisdiction
could not be asserted over the case for three main reasons: (1) NAB’s
actions were “more central to the fraud” than the manipulation of numbers
by HomeSide in Florida;40 (2) the Plaintiffs did not allege any effect on
American markets or investors;41 and (3) there was a “lengthy chain of
causation” between the fraudulent domestic conduct and the harm to the
Plaintiffs.42 The Second Circuit also specifically rejected the adoption of a
bright-line rule that subject matter jurisdiction could never be established
over “foreign-cubed” securities actions based on the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of congressional statutes.43 The Supreme

35. Id.
36. See Nicolas Grabar, Second Circuit Limits Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Laws in Benchmark “Foreign-Cubed” Class Action Decision, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY
Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 18228) (2009)
(defining a “foreign-cubed” action as “a suit by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign issuer based on
securities transactions in a foreign country”); James F. Moyle & Steven L. Penaro, Foreign Bank
Issuer. Foreign Plaintiff. Foreign Transaction. Class Action Exposure in the U.S. Under Federal
Securities Laws? 127 BANKING L.J. 458, 459 (2010) (explaining that “‘f-cubed’ cases involve (1)
a foreign purchaser; (2) suing a foreign issuer for violations of U.S. securities laws; (3) with
respect to securities transactions in foreign countries”).
37. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, federal courts (erroneously) framed the
question of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws as one of subject matter jurisdiction.
See supra Part I.
38. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *11–20
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction because the predominant
fraudulent conduct occurred in Australia, rather than in the United States, and the alleged fraud
had essentially no effect on the U.S. market).
39. See Morrison, 547 F.3d at 175.
40. Id. at 176.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 176–77.
43. See id. at 174–75.
AND THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009:
ENVIRONMENT 781 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
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Court granted certiorari44 and in its decision, focused precisely on the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of American laws.45
A. THE NEW (AND UNANTICIPATED) “TRANSACTIONAL” TEST
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit, but at
the same time, rejected and replaced the familiar “conduct and effects”
analysis utilized by federal courts for forty years.46 First, the Court
corrected an error made by lower courts with regard to the threshold issue
of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, saying that it is
not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, but one on the merits of the
case.47 The Court then invoked a longstanding principle of statutory
interpretation that unless a contrary intent appears, a congressional statute is
meant only to apply within the United States.48 As such, the Court
concluded that § 10(b) does not apply outside the United States because
“there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies
extraterritorially.”49 The Court then declared that, since the language of the
Exchange Act focuses on the securities transaction in question and not on
where the relevant deceptive conduct occurred,50 § 10(b) applies only to
“transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities.”51 Since NAB’s securities were not listed on
a U.S. exchange and the relevant transactions did not take place in the
United States, the Court found that § 10(b) did not reach the alleged fraud

44. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009), cert. granted, 175 L.Ed.2d 513
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1191).
45. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–83 (2010) (criticizing the lower
federal courts for disregarding the longstanding presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws). See also infra Part II.A.
46. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Kahn, supra note 1, at
404 (noting that it has “been more than forty years since the decisions in Schoenbaum and Leasco
first applied the conduct and effects tests to determine the jurisdictional reach of the antifraud
provisions”).
47. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (majority opinion) (“[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is
to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by
contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s ‘power to hear a case.’’ . . . It presents an issue quite separate from
the question whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”) (internal citations
omitted).
48. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating that it is a “longstanding
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’”) (citations omitted).
49. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
50. Id. at 2884 (“[T]he focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) does not
punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.’”)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
51. Id.
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and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.52 This new
“transactional” test53 overturned nearly forty years of precedential law
related to transnational securities fraud in the Second Circuit and in much
of the rest of the country.54
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN

MORRISON
While the Plaintiffs in Morrison struck out under the “conduct” and
“effects” tests and the “transactional” test,55 many other investors who
previously would have had a claim under U.S. securities laws, no longer
have a cause of action.56 This is the case because the decision reaches
beyond just “foreign-cubed” actions.57 In fact, “foreign-cubed” cases appear
to be fairly uncommon, as evidenced by the Second Circuit’s statement that
Morrison was “the first so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ securities class action to
reach th[e] Circuit.”58 The implications of the new “transactional” test
articulated by the Court are far broader than affecting just “foreign-cubed”
litigation.59 In fact, the rights of all American investors who purchase
securities abroad are profoundly affected by this decision.60 Less certain is

52. Id. at 2888 (“This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all
aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still have live claims occurred
outside the United States. Petitioners have therefore failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.”).
53. See id. at 2886.
54. See id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost:
§ 10(B) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343, 356 (2011) (noting
that the conduct and effects tests were used by the Second Circuit “[f]or the better part of four
decades”).
55. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (finding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief
under the “transactional” test as § 10(b) does not reach the alleged fraud); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction under the
“conduct” and “effects” tests).
56. See infra Part II.B.1.
57. Ted Farris, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd. (June 28, 2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_corporate_morrisonvnationalbank_062510
/#page=1 (“[T]he rule announced in National Australia Bank has far broader application than . . .
‘foreign-cubed’ cases . . . [and is a] broadly stated holding.”).
58. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 172. Most securities class actions are brought in the Second Circuit.
See Securities Class Action Filings—2009: A Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 25
(2010),
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2009_YIR/Cornerstone_Research
_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf. Additionally, as noted in the concurring opinion in Morrison, “foreigncubed” cases “would fail the Second Circuit’s test” anyway, “as they generally should.” Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. See Theodore J. Sawicki & Todd Chatham, Foreign Cubed Cases: The Supreme Court
Contains a Potential Flood in Securities Litigation, in 27 SEC. LITIG: FORMS AND ANALYSIS
§ 1:10 (2011) (“[B]ecause Morrison turns on a transactions test, the decision will have impacts
that extend beyond foreign cubed cases.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath ‘Morrison’ Wrought?,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2010, at 5 (“Morrison affects much more than the ‘f-cubed’ class action.”).
60. Coffee, supra note 59 (“Morrison . . . will by its terms bar even private actions by
American investors who purchase the securities of American issuers on a foreign exchange.”).
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whether Morrison also limits the power of the SEC to bring enforcement
actions against foreign companies.61
1. Bright-Line Rule Against Americans Investing Abroad
The Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison is a bright-line rule barring
any American investor who purchases securities trading only on a foreign
exchange from bringing suit under U.S. securities laws.62 As a result,
American plaintiffs who purchase securities abroad, who once had a chance
to be heard in U.S. courts under the “conduct” or “effects” tests, will now
not even be able to get their foot in the door to be heard. This concern is
reflected in the concurring opinion to the Morrison decision63:
Imagine . . . an American investor who buys shares in a company listed
only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American
subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New
York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a massive
deception which artificially inflated the stock price—and which will, upon
its disclosure, cause the price to plummet . . . [The] investors would, under
the Court’s new test, be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b).64

In this scenario, where there is both wrongful conduct in the United
States and injury to U.S. markets and citizens, § 10(b) no longer applies.65
Plaintiffs in analogous circumstances were previously able to bring a claim
under U.S. securities laws. For example, the American plaintiffs in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, were fraudulently induced to
buy stock in a British company, which did not trade domestically.66 The
plaintiffs were able to bring suit in the United States under the “conduct”
61. The concurrence in Morrison states that the Court’s decision leaves the SEC’s enforcement
power unaffected. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 n.12. However, the Court did not distinguish
between private plaintiffs and the SEC in its holding. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59.
62. See Farris, supra note 57 (observing that the new test will likely “disallow Rule 10b-5
claims by a US plaintiff purchasing securities abroad of any issuer whether domestic or foreign
where the securities are not listed in the United States”). See also Adam Johnson, Jonathan Cary
& Alex Bafi, Foreign-cubed Securities Actions: The End of the Line?, PRAC. L. CO. (July 28,
2010), http://finance.practicallaw.com/5-502-8826 (stating that the transactional test “limits the
ability of US plaintiffs to bring actions under the anti-fraud provisions of the . . . [Exchange Act]
in circumstances where they acquire non-US listed securities and the transactions take place
outside the US”).
63. Supreme Court Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment but disagreed
with the reasoning of the Court. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“While I
agree that petitioners have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, my reasoning
differs from the Court’s.”).
64. Id. at 2895.
65. See Glen Devalerio & Jeffrey C. Block, High Court Thumbs Nose at Investors, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.pionline.com/article/20101101/PRINTSUB
/311019999 (“[T]he high court wiped out four decades of judicial precedent, severely limiting
investors’ ability to hold multinational companies accountable for their misdeeds—even those that
take place in the United States or hurt U.S. investors.”).
66. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972).
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test because of deceptive acts that took place in the United States.67 The
court in Leasco emphasized the importance of protecting American
investors.68 Under the “transactional” test, however, such plaintiffs are now
completely barred from bringing a securities fraud case in U.S. courts.69
2. Application of the “Transactional” Test Since Morrison
The test articulated in Morrison is being applied broadly by district
courts70 and has already barred many American investors from pursuing
securities fraud class actions in the United States.71 In one of the first
securities fraud actions faced by a district court after Morrison, a judge in
the Southern District of New York held that, in light of Morrison, the
claims of American plaintiffs who purchased shares of Credit Suisse on the
Swiss stock exchange were barred.72 Citing Morrison, the court held that
§ 10(b) does “not apply to transactions involving (1) a purchase or sale,
wherever it occurs, of securities listed only on a foreign exchange, or (2) a
purchase or sale of securities, foreign or domestic, which occurs outside the
United States.”73
Since then, plaintiffs’ attorneys have made several creative arguments
in an attempt to circumvent the holding in Morrison, but have been
unsuccessful.74 In a securities fraud class action led by an American pension
fund against Swiss Reinsurance Co.,75 plaintiffs argued that their purchases
were actually made in the United States because the buy orders were placed
in the United States.76 The court rejected this argument and held that “a
purchase order in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign
exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act” and dismissed the case.77 Similarly, a $2 billion
67. Id. at 1334–35.
68. See id. at 1337.
69. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (rejecting the “conduct” and “effects” test and limiting
the application of U.S. securities laws to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges,
and domestic transactions in other securities”).
70. Fred T. Isquith, Interpreting Morrison v. National Australia Bank, LAW 360 (Nov. 3, 2010,
10:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/206320.
71. See generally Nathan Koppel & Ashby Jones, Securities Ruling Limits Claims of Fraud,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036942045755183
01351548676.html; Luke Green, Securities Class Actions Post Q1 2011: Around the Horn, ISS
GOVERNANCE SECURITIES LITIGATION WATCH BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011, 12:29 PM),
http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/04/securities-class-actions-post-q1-2011-around-the-horn
.html; Isquith, supra note 70.
72. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
73. Id. at 623–24.
74. Isquith, supra note 70.
75. Shares of Swiss Reinsurance Co. are only listed on a Swiss stock exchange. Plumbers’
Union Local No. 12 v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
76. Id. at 177.
77. See id. at 178. In addition to finding that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not apply, the
court also held that the plaintiff failed to allege fraud with the necessary particularity. See id. See
also Patricia Hurtado, Swiss Re Wins Dismissal of Credit Default Swaps Suit, BLOOMBERG, Oct.
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securities fraud lawsuit brought by several hedge funds against Porsche,
whose stock trades in Germany, was dismissed despite plaintiffs’ argument
that they used swap agreements that were transacted in the United States,
rather than trading in the underlying security.78 In another case against
UBS, plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed where UBS common shares traded
both on the NYSE and a foreign exchange.79 Despite this, the court held that
only the claims based on shares actually trading in the United States could
proceed, thus wiping out almost 90 percent of potential damages.80 In an
action against Alstom SA (Alstom),81 plaintiffs argued that since the
company had ADRs listed on a U.S. exchange, the securities purchased on a
French stock exchange should also be covered by § 10(b) for American
investors.82 This argument was rejected as well, with the court emphasizing
that under the “transactional” test, the “focus [is] on where the transaction
actually occurs,” not whether the company’s securities are also listed on a
U.S. exchange.83 The claims of Alstom ADR purchasers were not affected
by this decision.84

4, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-04/swiss-re-wins-dismissal-of-lawsuit-in-u-sover-credit-default-swaps.html.
78. Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“Plaintiffs’ swaps were the functional equivalent of trading the underlying VW shares on a
German exchange. . . . Plaintiffs’ swap agreements are essentially ‘transactions conducted upon
foreign exchanges and markets,’ and not ‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of
§ 10(b).”).
79. See In re UBS Sec. Litig., No. 07-11225, 2011 WL 4059356, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2011); Alison Frankel, Investors Lose Last, Best Chance to Stem Morrison Bloodbath, THOMPSON
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Sept. 14, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal
/News/2011/09_-_September/Investors_lose_last,_best_chance_to_stem_Morrison_bloodbath
(“About 12 percent of UBS shares are listed in the United States,” thus, “an investor could buy a
share of UBS on the Swiss exchange in the morning and trade it on the NYSE in the afternoon.”).
80. Frankel, supra note 79.
81. Plaintiffs included American investors who purchased Alstom stock on a French stock
exchange as well as ADRs on the NYSE. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469,
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
82. See id. at 471–72; Isquith, supra note 70.
83. See In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472. A similar conclusion was reached in an action
against Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), where the court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs who
purchased RBS ordinary shares trading on foreign exchanges, despite plaintiffs’ argument that
RBS ADRs were listed on the NYSE. In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F.
Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The idea that a foreign company is subject to U.S. Securities
laws everywhere it conducts foreign transactions merely because it has ‘listed’ some securities in
the United States is simply contrary to the spirit of Morrison.”).
84. Isquith, supra note 70 (noting that the claims of ADR purchasers were not dismissed).
Similarly, in a decision appointing lead plaintiff in a securities class action against Toyota, the
court noted that the claims of purchasers of Toyota’s stock, which trades on the Tokyo stock
exchange, would likely be dismissed, while the claims of ADR purchasers would remain. As a
result, however, recoverable losses of the lead plaintiff shrunk from nearly $17 million to around
$250,000. See Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1–3 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 2010); Dorothy Heyl, Federal Courts Apply ‘Morrison’ Expansively, N.Y. L.J., Nov.
19, 2010, at 4.
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Since the decision in Alstom, however, ADR purchasers have been
added to the list of those investors excluded from U.S. courts.85 In a
securities fraud class action against Société Générale (SocGen), the court
dismissed not only the claims of U.S. investors who had purchased SocGen
stock on a foreign exchange, but also the claims of U.S. investors who
purchased ADRs over the counter in the United States.86 Further narrowing
the rights of American investors, the court stated that § 10(b) was not
applicable since the SocGen ADRs were not listed on an “official American
securities exchange” and trades in ADRs are considered to be a
“predominantly foreign securities transaction.”87 There is some
inconsistency among the district courts on this issue, however. In a
subsequent securities fraud action, the court, without explaining its
reasoning, declined to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs who purchased ADRs
on a U.S. exchange.88 Despite this, many courts appear to be interpreting
the holding in Morrison expansively,89 substantially limiting the ability of
American investors to seek redress for losses due to securities fraud.90
3. Morrison is Harmful Policy and Could Leave American
Investors Unprotected
The expansive application of Morrison essentially incentivizes
companies to ensure that transactions in their securities occur outside of the
United States in order to avoid securities fraud liability: “[A]nyone selling
complex financial instruments should just insist that buyers complete the
transactions out of the borders of the United States. That way, no matter
how badly sellers misrepresent the securities, they’re protected by the
impermeable heat shield the U.S. Supreme Court erected in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank.”91 Indeed, as noted earlier, foreign companies
85. See BNA Sec. Law Daily, Morrison Ripples Bar Investors’ Suit; SocGen Investors Cannot
Use U.S. Courts (Oct. 5, 2010).
86. The court acted sua sponte in dismissing the claims related to the ADRs, as SocGen had
only moved to dismiss against the purchasers of the foreign exchange traded stock. See In re
Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2010); Daniel Snare, Expanding Morrison to Bar 10(b) Claims for ADR Transactions Made on the
OTC, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 15, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom
.org/securities-issues/2010/11/15/expanding-morrison-to-bar-10b-claims-for-adr-transactions-ma
.html.
87. Société Générale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *7–11 (citations omitted).
88. Kleinman v. Elan Corp. (In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig.), No. 08-8761 (AKH), 2011 WL
1442328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011). It is unclear if trading ADRs on an official exchange, as
opposed to an over-the-counter market, was relevant to the court’s decision.
89. See Heyl, supra note 84.
90. See Koppel & Jones, supra note 71 (“Judges have been interpreting the ruling in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd. as preventing fraud claims in U.S. courts by any investor–either
from the U.S. or abroad–who purchased shares on foreign exchange.”).
91. Alison Frankel, Morrison Strikes Again! Goldman Get $1 Bl Fraud Case Tossed,
THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, July 21, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com
/Legal/News/2011/07_-_July/Morrison_strikes_again!_Goldman_get_$1_bl_fraud_case_tossed/.
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have already benefitted under the “transactional” test and will likely
continue to do so as more companies avoid listing or effecting securities
transactions in the United States.92
The legacy of Morrison is a shocking loss of protection for American
investors, as investment overseas is not uncommon. Indeed, in 2007, about
36 percent of investing Americans owned foreign stocks.93 Many domestic
investors are mutual funds and pension plans, which invest in multinational
companies and buy stock overseas in order to access more liquidity than
they would by purchasing ADRs of foreign companies on a domestic
exchange.94 BP is an example of a foreign company that stands to save
billions, at the expense of American investors, as a result of the Court’s
decision.95 A few American pension and retirement funds purportedly
suffered $200 million in BP stock losses because BP misled investors about
their safety precautions related to drilling.96 The decision in Morrison
shrinks the recoverable losses in U.S. court by more than $175 million once
the losses on stock purchased abroad are stripped out.97 Morrison also takes
aim at investors who prevailed in a jury trial in January 2010 when jurors
found that Vivendi was liable for fifty-seven misstatements to
shareholders.98 A post-trial decision amended the class certification to
exclude purchasers of ordinary shares of Vivendi abroad and may reduce
potential damages of nearly $9 billion by as much as 80 percent.99 At a time
when American investors have suffered severe financial losses due to
widespread corporate mishandling and a worldwide economic downturn,

92. Farris, supra note 57. Morrison gives
issuers and underwriters a bright line test they can potentially use to avoid Rule 10b-5
liability in international securities transactions. For example, foreign issuers selling non
US listed securities to US institutions may insist that those purchasers buy their
securities in an offshore transaction by a non US affiliate in an effort to remain beyond
the reach of Rule 10b-5.
Id.

93. Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Divided as to Effect of Foreign Investing on U.S. Economy,
GALLUP (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26905/public-divided-effect-foreigninvesting-us-economy.aspx.
94. Koppel & Jones, supra note 71.
95. See Greg Stohr, BP, Vivendi Among Companies that may Save Billions from Ruling,
BLOOMBERG, June 28, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/bp-vivendi-amongcompanies-that-may-save-billions-after-high-court-ruling.html.
96. Koppel & Jones, supra note 71.
97. Id.
98. See Jennifer Thompson, Vivendi in US Legal Victory Against Investors, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
23,
2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/193a6300-3f5f-11e0-8e48-00144feabdc0.html
#axzz1Y2oFuFRe.
99. Id.; Chad Bray, Vivendi Fraud Claims Ruled Limited to ADR Holders, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704071304576160864164657034
.html.
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Morrison essentially “gives foreign companies diplomatic immunity when
it comes to charges of securities fraud.”100
C. LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT POWER OF THE
SEC
Although Morrison involved a private right of action, since § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, are also used by
the SEC to bring enforcement actions,101 the decision in Morrison may
affect the ability of the SEC to pursue claims against foreign companies on
behalf of investors.102 There is ambiguity, however, as to whether the
Court’s decision limits the SEC’s authority because even though the
decision did not specifically address the government enforcement of
§ 10(b),103 neither did it expressly protect the SEC’s authority to bring
extraterritorial actions under § 10(b).104 While the concurring opinion in
Morrison noted that the majority’s opinion did not prevent the SEC from
bringing enforcement actions against foreign companies,105 several
commentators believe otherwise.106
100. Steve W. Berman, Misguided Supreme Court Decision Gives Foreign Companies
Diplomatic Immunity, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:54 PM), http://blog
.seattlepi.com/steveberman/archives/224511.asp.
101. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 67
(2009).
102. See Advisory, Stewart D. Aaron et al, Arnold & Porter LLP, US Supreme Court Limits
Extraterritorial Reach of the US Securities Laws; Congress Acts (July 2010),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory-US_Supreme_Court_Limits_Extra
territorial_Reach_of_the_US_Securities_Laws_062810.pdf (noting that “because Section 10(b) is
also utilized by the SEC as an anti-fraud enforcement mechanism, the Opinion raises significant
questions as to the SEC’s authority to pursue companies under Section 10(b) that are not
registered on US exchanges”).
103. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“Morrison does not limit its holding to private
plaintiffs. It makes no distinction as to the limits imposed in this context on private plaintiffs and
on the SEC.”). Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 n.12 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the opinion does not affect the SEC’s enforcement power).
104. See Luke Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank – The Dawn of a New Age?,
ISS:SEC. LITIG. (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/06/morrisonv-national-australia-bank---the-dawn-of-a-new-age.html (“The opinion does not carve out an
exception for the extraterritorial reach of SEC . . . actions. Thus, it could be construed to place the
same limitations on these agencies as it does on private claimants.”). The SEC, in its amicus brief,
urged the Supreme Court to adopt separate tests of extraterritoriality for private plaintiffs and SEC
enforcement actions. This request was denied. See Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti,
Applicability to SEC of Private Action Requirements in § 10(b) Cases, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 2010, at
3.
105. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not,
however, foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in additional circumstances, as
no issue concerning the [SEC’s] authority is presented by this case.”).
106. See Allens Arthur Robinson, Focus: US Courts’ Extraterritorial Reach in Securities Fraud
Cases Reinstated (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/ldr/focsraug10.htm (stating that the
transactional test “applie[s] equally to the enforcement activities of the SEC . . . under the
Exchange Act”); Farris, supra note 57 (suggesting that the decision in Morrison “may subject
SEC . . . enforcement actions to the Court’s new extraterritoriality test”); Nicholas I. Porritt,
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In response to this concern, Congress directly addressed the issue in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the DoddFrank Act or Dodd-Frank).107 Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act108
amends the Exchange Act to expressly provide extraterritorial jurisdiction
for SEC actions under § 10(b), using a modified conduct and effects test.109
Specifically, it extends U.S. jurisdiction to SEC enforcement actions where
there was “(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States.”110 While Congress did not interfere with
Morrison as it applies to private actions, it did acknowledge the importance
of the issue by instructing the SEC to solicit public comments and conduct a
study111 as to whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be extended to
private actions under § 10(b).112

Supreme Court Observations: Scalia Opinion Rejects “F-Cubed” Securities Suits in Morrison,
THE LEGAL PULSE (June 24, 2010), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2010/06/24/ihigh-court-rejects-fcubed-suits-in-morrison/ (noting that “the inapplicability of Section 10(b), the primary anti-fraud
provision in the Act, is a severe loss to the [SEC] with regard to international fraud”); Gold &
Spinogatti, supra note 104 (“In light of the Court’s rationale and its holding . . . it is difficult to
see how the SEC would not [be] subject to the Morrison analysis.”).
107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
108. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1862 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
109. See Aaron et al, supra note 102 (noting that in the Dodd-Frank Act, “Congress provides
for U.S. jurisdiction over extraterritorial actions brought by the SEC . . . under the anti-fraud
provisions of the US securities laws by codifying a variant of the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ test”);
Daniel Zinn, Commentary: “Foreign-Cubed” Redux, TRADERS MAGAZINE ONLINE NEWS (Sept.
22, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/sec-foreign-cubed-106356-1.html (“The [DoddFrank] Act directly reverses the Morrison decision as it pertains to regulatory actions brought by
the SEC.”); Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 104 (“Section 929P of Dodd-Frank specifically amends
. . . the Exchange Act to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for SEC . . . actions under the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, thus resolving any uncertainties following Morrison
about its applicability to SEC enforcement actions.”).
110. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1862 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
111. The study will analyze:


the scope of such a private remedy, including whether it should extend to all
private actors or should be limited to institutional investors or otherwise;



the implications such a right of action would have on international comity;



the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for
transnational securities frauds; and



whether a narrow extraterritorial standard is called for.

BNA Sec. Law Daily, SEC Seeks Comments on Extension of Private Actions to Global Securities
Fraud (Oct. 27, 2010).
112. This directive is contained in § 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act and instructs the SEC to
report back to Congress with the results of the study within eighteen months after enactment. See
Luke Green, Dodd-Frank: Whistleblowers, Clawbacks, and Morrison Developments, ISS:SEC.
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Unfortunately, the situation is further complicated by the belief that the
Dodd-Frank provision, extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to SEC
enforcement actions, was incorrectly drafted, and is therefore, ineffective.113
Specifically, it has been noted that “[t]he provision unambiguously
addresses only the ‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘district courts of the United States’
to hear cases involving extraterritorial elements; its language does not
expand the geographic scope of any substantive regulatory provision.” 114 In
other words, this perceived error in the provision hinges on the Supreme
Court’s declaration that the extraterritorial application of securities laws is
not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.115 Congress may have
erroneously addressed the power of the federal courts to hear a case, rather
than the scope of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.116 As a
result, not only have American investors lost a private right of action under
U.S. antifraud provisions when they invest abroad, but they may have lost
the enforcement protection of the SEC in such situations as well.117

LITIG. (Nov. 2, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/11/dodd-frankwhistleblowers-clawbacks-and-morrison-developments.html.
113. The notion that the provision was ineffective was brought to light by George T. Conway
III of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz who represented NAB in the Morrison litigation. See
George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010
/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank. See also Kevin LaCroix, Morrison Precludes FSquared Cases, Too, Court Concludes, THE D & O DIARY (July 28, 2010),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/07/articles/securities-litigation/morrison-precludes-fsquaredcases-too-court-concludes.
114. See Conway, supra note 113; Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, BNA World Sec.
Law Report, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Law After the Morrison Decision and
the Dodd-Frank Act (Oct. 12, 2010) (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act did not amend the statutory text
upon which the Supreme Court based its new ‘transactional test’ for the extraterritorial application
of §10(b). Accordingly, an argument exists that the Dodd-Frank Act does nothing to augment the
substantive scope of the Securities Exchange Act or overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in
Morrison.”).
115. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 570–71 (2011). See
also Conway, supra note 113 (“In [Morrison], the Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding
principle that the territorial scope of a federal law does not present a question of ‘jurisdiction,’ of a
‘tribunal’s power to hear a case,’ but rather a question of substance—of ‘what conduct’ does the
law ‘prohibit’? The new law does not address that issue, and accordingly does not expand the
territorial scope of the government’s enforcement powers at all.”).
116. See Beyea, supra note 115, at 571 (“While Congress’s intent in including this language
was clearly to preserve the conduct and effects tests, the language of the Act as drafted does not
actually do so.”).
117. Id. at 571–72 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act may not have any effect on the application of
Section 10(b), depending on the willingness of courts to overlook the plain language of the statute,
even if this language is the result of a simple drafting error.”); Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham
& Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 1, 19 (2011) (“[T]he SEC still might not fare well before
some lower court judges who do not care about the intent of Congress when Congress fails to
clearly express that intent. If the Dodd-Frank Act . . . only speaks to jurisdiction, some courts may
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D. THE FUTURE FOR AMERICANS INVESTING OVERSEAS
By limiting the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, “the
Court narrows the provision’s reach to a degree that would surprise and
alarm generations of American investors—and . . . the Congress that passed
the Exchange Act.” 118 Domestic investors who purchase and sell securities
traded only on foreign exchanges are no longer able to invoke U.S.
securities laws if they suffer losses due to securities fraud.119 This is not
insignificant, as 12.4% of securities class actions filed in the United States
in 2009 were against foreign issuers.120 These investors, and many before
them, relied on the robust nature of U.S. securities laws and court
procedures to protect themselves while investing in the transnational
marketplace.121 Going forward, however, domestic investors must consider
alternative ways to seek redress for losses caused by securities fraud.
Currently, because of Morrison, Americans invested overseas have no
choice but to seek a remedy under the laws and procedures of the foreign
countries in which their securities were purchased.122 Commencing a
securities fraud action abroad is easier said than done, however, as “most
[foreign countries] do not have a class action framework and may not have
a developed body of securities law” comparable to that of the United
States.123 The next section of this note will examine some of the securities
class action procedures in other countries, how they compare to those in the
not be willing to read into the provision what Congress clearly intended: to empower the SEC to
bring cases where the conduct was that described in the statute.”).
118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“Domestic investors who purchase securities of a
foreign issuer on a foreign exchange will no longer enjoy the ability to resort to the U.S. courts
and legal remedies in the event that they sustain any loss due to securities fraud.”).
120. In 2008, 13.5% of securities class actions filed in the United States were against foreign
issuers, and in 2007, 16.4% of securities class actions filed in the United States were against
foreign issuers. Securities Class Action Filings—2009: A Year in Review, supra note 58, at 11.
121. Kevin M. LaCroix, Further Implications of Morrison v. National Bank and the Prohibition
Against Pursuing Fraud Claims for Securities Purchased on Foreign Exchanges, CORP. & SEC. L.
BLOG (June 28, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate
andsecuritieslawblog/archive/2010/06/28/further-implications-of-morrison-v-national-bank-andthe-prohibition-against-pursuing-fraud-claims-for-securities-purchased-on-foreign-exchanges.aspx
(“As the filing levels . . . demonstrate, these investors increasingly had come to rely on the U.S.
processes and remedies as a way to seek redress when they felt they had been misled.”); Adam T.
Savett, Globalization in Securities Class Actions: Part 1–Non-US Investor Interest in US Suits,
RISKMETRICS GRP. 4 (Dec. 2008) (“[T]he most robust system for investors seeking recoveries
through securities litigation remains here in the US.”).
122. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“[I]nvestors are now left to seek redress in a
foreign country, under the laws of the issuer’s country and possibly the laws governing the foreign
exchange on which the shares are traded.”).
123. Robert Cox, Andrew Lazerow & Tonya Gaskins, The Supreme Court Slams the Door to
DEFENDER
(Summer
2010),
U.S.
Courts
for
F-Cubed
Litigation,
THE
http://thedefender.howrey.com/files/FileControl/281c9044-ef01-4294-a524-ae6fc4a12a0e
/7483b893-e478-44a4-8fed-f49aa917d8cf/Presentation/File/Defender_072210_final.pdf. See also
Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 484 (stating that few other countries have a class action
mechanism as robust as that found in the United States).
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United States, and whether, because of Morrison, American investors are
left without adequate protection against foreign corporate fraud.
III. SEEKING REDRESS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD OVERSEAS
Class actions,124 such as the one brought in Morrison, overcome
collective action problems in situations where many individuals or entities
are injured by the conduct of another by “providing an effective and
inexpensive procedure for joining large numbers of individual plaintiffs.”125
Class actions provide access to justice,126 and have “enormous potential to
deter institutional and corporate wrongdoing and to shift the balance of
power” between individual plaintiffs and powerful corporations.127 While
class actions are commonplace in the United States, several countries do not
have any kind of group litigation procedure.128 Without such an option,
small injuries to many individual investors go unremedied since the injured
are unlikely to be able to incur the cost of litigation alone.129 As such, the
presence of some type of claim aggregation procedure is thought to be vital
to the rights of investors.130 While it is true that several countries have
adopted some form of group litigation procedure,131 many of these countries
advance various measures, not found in the United States, that present

124. A class action is a civil lawsuit brought by a private actor on behalf of a large number of
similarly situated, but absent, parties. Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An
Overview, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 7, 13 (Deborah Hensler, Christopher Hodges & Magdalena Tulibacka eds. 2009).
125. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 914–15 (2005) (explaining that class actions overcome the difficulties
caused by bringing litigants together using traditional joinder and intervention procedures, which
are costly and organizationally difficult). See also Yves Heijmans, Class Actions in Belgium and
Europe, 24 No.3 ACC DOCKET 117 (Mar. 2006) (“Class actions are seen as an effective way to
facilitate damages actions by spreading the costs and risks of individual litigation. This can be
particularly useful when a large number of persons have suffered a small individual loss.”);
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 23 Amendments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102–03 (1966) (noting that
class actions may “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated”).
126. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARITIVE PERSPECTIVE 52–54 (2004) (noting that class actions provide “substantive law with
teeth,” allow injured parties to overcome cost-related barriers, and balance an adversarial structure
where defendants usually enjoy the upper hand in small scale individual litigation).
127. Hensler, supra note 124, at 9.
128. See Cox, Lazerow & Gaskins, supra note 123.
129. See EISENBERG, supra note 125, at 915.
130. In the forum non conveniens context, some courts have held that lack of both claim
aggregation and opt-out procedures “do not afford a meaningful remedy to class action plaintiffs”
and have rendered such jurisdictions inadequate to hear a claim. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at
37.
131. Countries that have some sort of representative class action mechanism include “Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden[,] and United Kingdom (England and Wales).” John J. Clarke, Jr. &
Keara M. Gordon, Global Realm of Securities Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 2008, at S4.
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significant obstacles to plaintiffs pursuing a group action for securities
fraud.132
A. LITIGATION FUNDING MEASURES
One of the major obstacles to bringing litigation abroad is the way
litigation is commonly funded outside the United States. Contingency fee
agreements are permitted in the United States, whereby plaintiffs’ attorneys
fund litigation and then receive a percentage of any class settlement or
judgment.133 If the plaintiff class is unsuccessful, however, class counsel
gets nothing and absorbs the litigation expenses.134 Thus, contingency
agreements shift the entire financial risk of class action litigation from the
class to class counsel.135 As a result, lawyers are incentivized to vigorously
pursue meritorious class actions since nothing will be recovered if the
litigation is unsuccessful.136 Countries that prohibit contingency fees—
including Australia,137 England,138 Germany,139 India,140 Japan, 141 and the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See infra Part III.A–D.
See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 469.
See Hensler, supra note 124, at 23.
See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 468.
See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Chen Jian-Lin, Reforming China’s Securities Civil
Actions: Lessons from PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit
Enforcement in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115, 134 (2008) (“Contingency fees provide
incentives for lawyers to organize and pursue class actions, and indeed, in the U.S., class actions
are often lawyer-initiated and lawyer-driven.”); Mike Myers, Benefits of the Contingent-Fee
Agreement, CONTINGENT FEE BUS. LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2008, 11:13 AM), http://www.con
tingentfeeblog.com/2008/08/articles/contingent-fee-representation/benefits-of-the-contingentfeeagreement/.
137. Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131 (noting that contingent fee agreements are prohibited in
Australia but ‘no win, no fee’ arrangements are permitted). In a “no win, no fee” or “conditional
fee” arrangement, if successful, plaintiffs’ counsel receives “a time-based rate, increased by a
multiplication factor” or uplift that is “typically not tied to a percentage of the award[].”
Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Corporate Class Actions in Australia (June 2006),
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/2006/Jun/8472865W.htm;
Stefano
M.
Grace,
Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S. - Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis
Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 287 (2006). The “no win, no fee”
arrangement, however, decreases the incentive for lawyers to bring class actions. See Hensler,
supra note 124, at 24. Additionally, a litigation funding system has emerged in Australia where a
company may enter an agreement with a plaintiff to fund the litigation in return for an agreed
upon percentage of any received award. The company then has “broad discretion to conduct the
litigation as [it] see[s] fit.” S. Stuart Clark, Thinking Locally, Suing Globally: The International
Frontiers of Mass Tort Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNSEL J. 139, 141 (2007).
138. See Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131. England, however, does permit “conditional fee”
arrangements. Heather Smith, Is America Exporting Class Actions to Europe?, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1141047298349.
139. See Grace, supra note 137, at 300.
140. See V. Umakanth, Shareholder Activism and Class Action Lawsuits, INDIAN CORP. LAW
BLOG (June 1, 2009, 7:41 AM), http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2009/06/shareholder-activismand-class-action.html.
141. See Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends, 17
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 185 (2008–2009). Japan does “permit a success fee, allowing plaintiffs’
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Netherlands142—essentially prevent access to justice for claimants who are
unable to afford attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs up front.143
Additionally, in the United States, regardless of the outcome, each party
is responsible for paying its own litigation fees and expenses.144 This is
significant, as the class representative is protected from the financial risk of
having to pay the defendant’s costs in the event of a loss.145 The “American
rule,” as it is known,146 is “considered an important measure in removing
the barriers to class proceedings.”147 In contrast, under the “English rule” of
fee shifting, the losing party pays the costs of the prevailing party.148 The
“loser pays” rule is a significant disincentive to bringing class action
litigation due to the high risk for the representative plaintiff of liability for
all of the defendant’s costs if the defendant prevails.149 A number of
countries—including Argentina,150 Australia,151 Canada,152 China,153
England,154 Germany,155 the Netherlands,156 and Sweden157—utilize the
“English rule” of fee shifting, where “large cost awards against
unsuccessful plaintiffs . . . have a chilling effect and [are] likely [to]
discourage meritorious class actions.”158
The absence of contingency fee agreements and the risks associated
with “loser pays” rules deter the initiation of class actions, as representative
plaintiffs are unlikely to emerge to represent a class if they must bear the
entire cost of litigation and risk having to pay the costs of the defendant.159
Maintenance of legal funding rules such as these “do[es] not . . .
accommodate the realities of representative litigation”160 and presents a

attorneys to be paid a customary hourly rate, regardless of the outcome, as well as an additional
payment if the client wins.” Id.
142. See Grace, supra note 137, at 296.
143. Id. at 288.
144. Hensler, supra note 124, at 22.
145. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 436.
146. Id. at 436 n.3.
147. Id. at 436 (internal quotations omitted).
148. See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 436–37.
149. See Grace, supra note 137, at 290.
150. See Héctor A. Mairal, Argentina, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54, 55 (2009). In exceptional cases, however, the court
may order each party to pay their own legal fees if “the controversy [is] sufficiently complex to
justify the decision of the loser to litigate.” Id.
151. See Clark, supra note 137, at 148.
152. See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Canada, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622
ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 45 (2009).
153. Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 128.
154. See Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131.
155. See Grace, supra note 137, at 300.
156. See id. at 296.
157. See id. at 295.
158. Kalajdzic, supra note 152, at 45.
159. Hensler, supra note 124, at 23.
160. Id. at 7.
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significant obstacle to injured parties pursuing private enforcement in many
foreign countries.161
B. OPT-OUT VERSUS OPT-IN PROCEDURES
Another mechanism which may hamper the ability of investors to
recover for securities fraud involves the procedure by which investors
become part of a class action. Under the opt-out class action regime, which
is found in the United States, class members are automatically part of the
class, unless they specifically exclude themselves from the litigation within
a certain timeframe.162 If a class member does not opt-out, he is bound by
the outcome of the case and shares in any settlement or award.163 An optout provision is beneficial to investors for a number of reasons: (1) it avoids
the possibility of a class member effectively losing his rights simply
because he forgot to affirmatively request class membership; (2) it
“enhances access to legal remedies for those who are disadvantaged . . .
[and] would be unable for one reason or another to take the positive step of
including themselves in the proceedings”; and (3) it ensures that defendants
are held liable for all losses, rather than avoiding responsibility because
some injured investors failed to opt-in to the class.164 The opt-out procedure
ultimately guarantees the inclusion of individuals who might be unable to
bring their own action due to cost or lack of resources.165
The opt-in procedure, on the other hand, requires that those, who wish
to be part of an investor class action, take steps to include themselves in the
litigation.166 As such, only claimants who affirmatively opt-in are class
members who will share in any award or settlement.167 In countries such as
China,168 England,169 Germany,170 and Sweden,171 which utilize the opt-in
161. Grace, supra note 137, at 287–90. An additional type of funding has emerged, known as
“no win/no pay” or a “conditional fee,” in which attorneys will fund litigation but the attorneys’
fees “may not be a percentage of damages obtained.” Attorneys may only recover their hourly
charges and expenses plus a limited premium (or “up-lift”). Hensler, supra note 124, at 22; Grace,
supra note 137, at 287.
162. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 34 (explaining that the opt-out model binds people “as
members of the class unless they take an affirmative step to indicate that they wish to be excluded
from the action and from the effect of the judgment” and “allows a class action to be commenced
by the representative plaintiff without . . . the express consent of the class members”).
163. Hensler, supra note 124, at 15. Those that do opt-out of the litigation exclude themselves
from any class settlement or award and may bring an individual claim against the defendant. Id.
164. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 35–38. The opt-out procedure also promotes the interests
of economy, consistency, and finality by avoiding multiple cases, avoiding different outcomes,
and resolving all similar claims against the defendant. See Grace, supra note 137, at 289.
165. Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 133.
166. Hensler, supra note 124, at 15–16.
167. Id. at 16.
168. See Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 129–30.
169. See Behrens, Fowler & Kim, supra note 141, at 175.
170. See Grace, supra note 137, at 299.
171. See id. at 294–95.
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procedure, potential claimants are at risk of losing the benefits of
participating in a class action if they are unaware of the class proceeding or
are otherwise unable to opt-in.172
C. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
The securities laws in other countries, and especially the requirements
related to proving the elements of securities fraud, may also prove
challenging for U.S. investors bringing suit abroad. The United States has
adopted the fraud on the market theory, whereby in securities fraud actions,
a plaintiff is presumed to have relied on the defendant’s material
misstatements by trading in the defendant’s stock in an efficient market at a
price which reflected the defendant’s fraud.173 In other words, in securities
class actions in the United States, individual proof of reliance on the
defendant’s fraudulent statements is not required.174 In contrast to the
United States, “most jurisdictions have not adopted the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine,”175 including, Australia,176 England,177 France,178 Germany,179
New Zealand,180 and Singapore.181 Thus, in securities class actions in these
and other countries, each plaintiff must individually prove reliance on the
defendant’s misstatements, which, in a class action, is nearly impossible

172. Hensler, supra note 124, at 16.
173. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 247 (1988) (“[A]n investor [in U.S. markets]
who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that
price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s
reliance on any public material representations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule
10b-5 action.”).
174. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 36.
175. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors and Students of the Yale Law School Capital
Markets and Financial Instruments Clinic in Support of Respondents, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 748251 at *4.
176. See Eilís Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming to the U.K.?, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD.
315, 336 (Oct. 2009) (noting that the “[f]raud on the market theory has not been adopted in
Australia”); Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131 (noting that in Australia, “the availability of the
‘fraud on the market’ presumption of reliance remains an open question”).
177. See Ferran, supra note 176, at 327 (noting that the fraud on the market presumption of
reliance, developed in the United States, has not been adopted in the U.K.).
178. See Hubert de Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and its
Foundations in France and the USA, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 203, 218 (1997) (noting that the
fraud on the market doctrine has not been incorporated in France).
179. See Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 71 n.89 (2005)
(commenting that individual reliance must be shown under German securities law, in contrast to
the fraud on the market theory in the United States).
180. See Boyd Knight v. Purdue, [1999] 2 NZLR 278, Lexis 406, at 42–43 (CA Wellington)
(rejecting the fraud on the market theory as contrary to the purpose of the New Zealand Securities
Act of 1978).
181. See Hans Tjio, Enforcing Corporate Disclosure, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 332, 349
(2009) (noting that, like the U.K., Singapore has not adopted the fraud on the market theory).
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due to high costs and inherent collective action problems.182 The lack of
recognition of the fraud on the market theory is an additional significant
hurdle which severely limits the opportunity for recovery by plaintiffs in
securities class actions abroad.183
D. OTHER LIMITATIONS
In addition to the aforementioned limitations, individual countries may
also maintain various procedures and rules, which further restrict the
successful implementation of securities class actions. For example, in order
to bring a civil action in China, it must be based on an existing
administrative sanction or criminal judgment against the defendant.184 As a
result, if no action has been taken against a defendant by a governmental
body, claimants have no recourse.185 In securities class actions in Israel,
investors must “convince the judge that they have a likelihood of
prevailing” in order to proceed.186 This provision gives judges significant
power in deciding whether a securities class action moves forward.187 In
South Korea, securities class actions are only permitted by a minimum of
fifty class members who collectively own at least .01 percent of the
defendant’s equity.188 This minimum shareholding requirement “undercuts .
. . class action law” by imposing a considerable barrier to securities class
actions against the largest companies.189 Finally, in Ontario, where most
Canadian securities class actions are brought,190 damages in securities class
actions are capped at the greater of $1 million or 5 percent of the market
capitalization of the issuer.191 Damage caps are a setback for plaintiffs who
have suffered far greater damages than what is recoverable and will likely

182. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 44 (commenting that requiring individual proof by each
plaintiff in a class action “would be procedurally impossible”); Tjio, supra note 181, at 349
(“[I]nvestor actions against issuers are severely hampered by the lack of a fraud on the market
theory, which militates against any actions by most investors due to the costs of securities
litigation and collective action problems.”).
183. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 36–37.
184. See Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 124–25.
185. See id. at 125 (explaining that investors cannot bring a cause of action if there is no
administrative sanction or criminal judgment against the defendant, “even if regulatory authorities
or prosecutors have detected securities fraud but, out of policy considerations, have chosen not to
take action”).
186. Gary L. Gassman & Perry S. Granof, Global Issues Affecting Securities Claims at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 101 (Fall 2007)
(internal quotations omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 103.
189. Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1522
(Oct. 2004). For example, the Korean company, Samsung, has a market capitalization of $39.1
billion. In order for claimants to bring a securities class action against Samsung, they would have
to collectively own $3.91 million in equity, which would be extremely difficult to meet. Id.
190. Gassman & Granof, supra note 186, at 88.
191. Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131.
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deter American investors from commencing securities class actions
Canada.192
These various mechanisms—in addition to the prohibitions on
contingency fees, prevalence of “loser pays” rules, opt-in procedures, and
non-recognition of the fraud on the market theory—serve as barriers to
securities class action litigation abroad,193 making investor suits impractical
and relatively rare outside of the United States.194 After Morrison, since
Americans investing overseas have no choice but to turn to these “toothless
investor protection schemes abroad,” such investors are significantly
disadvantaged and lack sufficient protection from foreign corporate
fraud.195
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD LEGISLATE TO MITIGATE THE
EFFECTS OF MORRISON
Congress should legislate to mitigate the harmful effects of Morrison
and restore the applicability of the antifraud provisions to Americans
investing outside the United States. Doing so would be consistent with the
purpose and intent of the Exchange Act196 and serve the interests of
increased global market integrity and investor confidence.197
The Congress of the 1930s could not have anticipated the extent to
which securities markets, business transactions, and national economies
would become globally interconnected.198 Therefore, the fact that Congress
did not explicitly address the issue of the extraterritorial application of
§ 10(b) is not unreasonable. Despite the lack of an explicit jurisdictional
statement, some scholars share the view that Congress “expected U.S.
securities laws to apply to certain international transactions or conduct.”199
Additionally, the antifraud provisions are recognized as being somewhat

192. Emily C. Cole, Recent Developments in Canadian Securities Class-Action Law, 20:4
A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. J. 13, 16 (2010), available at http://www.millerthomson.com/assets
/files/article_attachments/Emily_C_Cole_Recent_Developments_in_Canadian_Securities_ClassAction_Law.pdf.
193. See Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor
Protection, 41 INT’L LAW 1121, 1143–44 (2007).
194. See id. at 1121.
195. See id. at 1129 (stating that outside the United States, “it is nearly impossible for investors
to seek redress for losses caused by fraud”).
196. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657–59 (1997).
197. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1144 (arguing that increased investor protection is
necessary due to the globalization of securities markets).
198. Kahn, supra note 1, at 369–70 (noting that it is unsurprising that Congress did not provide
for the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) because “the Congress that enacted the securities
laws could not have anticipated the future globalization of the American economy”).
199. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 19. See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972) (detailing evidence that Congress “meant § 10(b) to protect
against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized
United States markets”).
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obscure,200 to the point that the Supreme Court itself has stated that there is
“judicial authority to shape . . . the 10b-5 cause of action.”201 It is with these
considerations in mind, that the Second Circuit sought to understand what
Congress would have wanted with respect to the extraterritorial application
of securities laws, given today’s transnational marketplace.202 Looking to
the congressional history of the Exchange Act, protection of American
investors is the focus of § 10(b).203 The intent behind § 10(b) was “to
remedy deceptive and manipulative conduct with the potential to harm the
public interest or the interest of investors.”204 This goal of investor
protection is clear in the congressional record: “[t]he 1934 Act was
designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices.”205 This
is a compelling justification for Congress to legislate to protect those
American investors who are barred from U.S. courts by Morrison. For
nearly forty years, the lower courts cited the abovementioned justifications
in applying the “conduct” and/or “effects” tests to determine the
extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions.206 In that time, Congress
could have legislated to modify the approach outlined by the Second Circuit
if it was overly broad or unfaithful to the purpose of the Exchange Act.207
Notably, Congress did not act.
The policy considerations underlying the Exchange Act—encouraging
investor confidence and protecting the integrity of the securities
markets208—require the extension of U.S. securities laws to fraudulent
conduct affecting American investors in the global securities market.209
200. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“The text and history of § 10(b) are famously opaque on the question of when, exactly,
transnational securities frauds fall within the statute’s compass.”).
201. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 293 (1993).
202. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d. Cir. 1975) (stating that when
“a court is confronted with transactions that . . . are predominantly foreign, it must seek to
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts
and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries”).
203. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the ‘public interest’ and
‘the interests of investors’” that are the focus of the Exchange Act.) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 (1934)); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (1934) (“The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 aims to protect the interests of the public against the predatory
operations of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations.”).
204. Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125
(2d. Cir. 1998) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32–33 (1934)).
205. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5
(1934)).
206. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the approach used
by the Second Circuit has been the law “for nearly four decades”).
207. See id. at 2891 (“The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress’
failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10(b) . . . argues significantly in
favor of acceptance of the [Second Circuit] rule by this Court.”) (internal citations omitted).
208. See U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657–59 (1997).
209. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1127 (“Globalization of the securities markets . . .
means that one act of securities fraud will cause investor losses around the globe. Therefore,
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Without the availability of “the most comprehensive securities regulation
scheme in the world”210 to adequately deter and compensate for foreign
corporate misconduct, Americans will be reluctant to invest, leading to
instability in U.S. markets and further adverse effects on investor
confidence.211
In order to adequately safeguard American investors and markets and
provide a remedy for fraudulent conduct occurring abroad, in conformity
with the purpose and intent of the Exchange Act, I propose that Congress
legislate on the issue and adopt a modified “effects” test in conjunction with
a “reasonability” inquiry. Such an approach will return robust investor
protection measures to Americans investing in securities abroad, balance
issues of international comity and fairness, and hopefully spur the
development of stronger investor protections and complementary group
litigation procedures overseas.
Under the first part of my suggested approach, the modified effects test,
the reach of U.S. antifraud provisions is presumed to extend to any
securities-related fraud which has an adverse effect on investors or related
interests within the United States, no matter where the securities were
purchased or where the fraudulent conduct actually occurred. Thus, any
American investor who suffers a loss in a foreign-traded stock due to
fraudulent conduct by a foreign issuer is presumptively protected by
§ 10(b), as is a holder of related securities, such as ADRs and options. A
significant number of investors need not be affected in order for American
plaintiffs to have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action under this part of the test,
and neither would a minimum amount of losses be required. Nevertheless,
similar to the “effects” test articulated by the Second Circuit, general claims
of an adverse effect on American economic interests would be insufficient
to meet this test, as they are too speculative.
The aforementioned presumption would be rebuttable, however, in the
second part of my suggested approach, which is an inquiry as to the
reasonableness of extending U.S. antifraud provisions to reach the specific
situation in question.212 This analysis would take into account certain
factors, such as the nationalities of the parties, the amount of losses suffered
by the claimants, whether there is a private right of action for securities
fraud in the issuer’s home country, whether there is a group litigation
securities fraud committed by multinational companies listing on international exchanges will
impact the whole world’s capital markets, causing market instability on a global scale.”);
Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22 (explaining that countries have an interest in protecting their own
citizens and markets from fraudulent activity occurring abroad).
210. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1121 (stating that “the United States has the most
comprehensive securities regulation scheme in the world”).
211. See id. at 1126 (“[T]he United States should strengthen investor protections, not weaken
them leaving investors more vulnerable to risk and making U.S. financial markets less stable.”).
212. This “reasonability” inquiry is loosely based on section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987).
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mechanism in the issuer’s home country, and whether the procedures
related to bringing group litigation in the issuer’s home country are
prohibitive, to determine the reasonableness of extending U.S. securities
laws to reach foreign issuers. Thus, it would likely be unreasonable to
extend the reach of U.S. antifraud provisions to situations where the loss
suffered by the plaintiffs is very small, the issuer’s home country allows a
private right of action for securities fraud, some type of group litigation
procedure exists there, and the procedures are not overly discouraging of
investor group actions. For example, if the issuer’s home country was
Canada, which permits class actions in Ontario, recognizes a private right of
action to recover damages based on false or misleading statements in
secondary market disclosures, allows contingency fees, presumes reliance
once misrepresentation is established, and the losses to the American
plaintiffs were relatively small, even though a “loser pays” system is
utilized and there are caps on damages, it would likely be reasonable for the
American plaintiffs to bring their action in Canada, and thus, the
presumption of the application of U.S. antifraud provisions would be
rebutted.
This combined approach mitigates the harmful effects of Morrison on
Americans investing abroad and presumes that injured American investors
have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action in the United States, unless the claimants
are likely to be as successful in bringing a similar claim in the issuer’s
home country. Thus, American investors are sufficiently protected from
fraudulent conduct regardless of where the securities are traded, and issues
of international comity and fairness are taken into consideration as well.
Under this approach, it is hoped that foreign jurisdictions, realizing that
U.S. securities laws will control much of the time when Americans invest
abroad, will be persuaded to take steps to strengthen their antifraud
measures and ease barriers to litigation for investors with meritorious
claims.
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